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RECENT CONSIDERATIONS OF THE AMBIGUITY RULE
W HILE insurance policies are contracts of insurance,1 they
differ from ordinary contracts in that insurance is a matter
of public concern.2 A familiar rule in the construction of con-
tracts is that ambiguous terms therein are to be construed most
strongly against the one drawing it.' The advantage obtainable
by being able to choose the wording is thought to justify such a
construction.4 This article will consider wherein this ambiguity
rule differs in its application to insurance policies as compared
to ordinary contracts as illustrated by recent cases.
1. WHEN APPLICABLE
It should first be noted that there is some conflict as to when
the insurer has drawn the policy. Where the policy is in standard
form complying with statutory requirements, some jurisdictions
hold the ambiguity rule inapplicable on the theory that the legis-
lature, and not the insurer, has drawn the policy.' The majority
of the jurisdictions, however, recognize that in reality the insurer
still chooses the word subject only to legislative disapproval.'
2. As APPLIED TO SPECIFIC TERMS
In a recent Texas case it was contended that the term "collision"
is broad enough to include the impact of flying debris against
the insured's car.' The loss was held to have been caused by the
tornado propelling the debris rather than a collision. The court
referred to the policy of the law to segregate and define the various
types of coverage available so that the public can pick the par-
1 International Travelers' Ass'n v. Gunther, 269 S.W. 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925)
rev'd on other grounds 280 S.W. 172 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926).
2 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389 (1914).
8 Lauea v. Grand Fraternity, 132 Tenn. 235, 117 S.W. 914 (1909).
4Algoe v. Pacific Mutual L. Ins. Co., 91 Wash. 324, 157 Pac. 993 (1916).
5 St. Landry Wholesale Co. v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 38 So. 87 (1905);
MacBey v. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co., 197 N.E. 576 (1935); Rosenthal v. Ins. Co. of
North America, 158 Wis. 550, 149 N.W. 155 (1914).
6 Gazam v. German Union Fire Ins. Co., 155 N. C. 330, 71 S.E. 434 (1911). See
29 Am. Jur. 179, #164 "Standard of Statutory Policy" for authorities cited there.
7 U. S. Ins. Co. v. Boyer, --------- Tex ............ 269 S.W. 2d 340 (1954).
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ticular type desired without having to include also a type not
desired.' It was then held that, notwithstanding the ambiguity
rule, terms of an insurance policy are to be given their usual and
popular significance.9
This decision is in line with earlier cases holding that hail
damage does not fall within collision coverage." One case that
does not seem to be in harmony with this general trend allowed
recovery where the insured's car "splashed" into flood waters
overflowing a bridge.' No damage was caused by the initial
"splash" but the car was subsequently washed away by the water
and totally destroyed. The court strained "collision" to the break-
ing point by including within that term the ebb and flow of the
water against the side of the car. The result is not without merit,
however, in that flood damage to a car would commonly be ex-
pected to occur while the car is stationary, and not while being
driven on a highway; whereas "collision" damage would generally
occur in circumstances such as those presented in this case.
This same term was before the Louisiana courts recently where
the insured claimed that the impact of his truck against the high-
way, caused by a collapse of the rear axle, was a "collision with
another object."' 2 The court resolved this ambiguous phrase against
the insurer by holding that a "collision" should be broadly defined
as a "striking together," and an "object" as "anything tangible."'
While this is a definition frequently given this phrase, 4 it is sel.
dom so construed where the object of the impact is the roadbed
proper. 5 The dissent expressed what is to believed to be the
majority rule in this situation as follows: "A highway is not such
an object as is commonly understood to be one which an automo-
bile comes into contact with in order for a collision to result."' 6
This case is to be distinguished from the Texas case above men-
8 Glenn Falls Ins. Co. v. McCown, 149 Tex. 587, 236 S.W. 2d 108 (1951).
9International Travelers' Ass'n v. Yates, 29 S.W. 2d 980 (Tex. Com. App. 1930).
10 American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Baker, 5 S.W. 2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
11 Providential Washington Ins. Co. v. Proffitt, 249 Tex. 587, 236 S.W. 2d 108 (1951).
12 Albritton v. Fireman's Fund Ins., Co., 224 La. 522, 70 So. 2d 111 (1953).
13 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. American Compounding Co., 211 Ala. 593,
100 So. 904, 35 A.L.R. 1018 (1924).
14 See note, 23 A.L.R. 2d at 410 for collection of cases.
15 Great Eastern Cas. Co. v Solinsky, 150 Tenn. 206, 263 S.W. 71 (1923).
"6 Brown v. Union Indem. Co., 159 La. 641, 105 So. 918 (1925).
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tioned in that here there was no compulsion to construe "collision"
narrowly so as to define types of coverage.
3. THE AMBIGUITY RULE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE
No mention was made in the Louisiana opinion of proximate
cause although its determination would logically seem to have
been presented. One case directly in point denied recovery on the
theory that the proximate cause of the damage was the breaking
of the axle. 7 If the court's silence on this point is to be interpreted
as an assumption that the rule was satisfied, the court committed
error. Recovery is allowed for a loss flowing in unbroken sequence
from causes set in motion by a peril insured against."8 It would
seem that the loss in this case flowed in unbroken sequence from
the breaking of the axle which could hardly be considered a peril
insured against under collision coverage.
A correct application of the above rule is illustrated by a recent
Oklahoma case where the insured's car was blown from an icy
road into an embankment.' 9 The court held it immaterial that a
cause expressly excluded (collision) contributed to the loss as
long as the cause covered is the efficient and proximate cause.2°
The loss flowed in unbroken sequence from the action of the wind,
which was a peril insured against.
There is some authority for the recognition of a distinction
between proximate cause as used in insurance cases and as used
in tort cases; in the former instance it is not applied to determine
culpability or why the damage occurred, but to determine the
nature of the damage or how it occurred. 2' Essentially the same
rationale was more fully expressed in Colley v. Pearl Assur. Co.
as follows: "The question of causation merges into the more fun-
damental question whether the damages to the car as they were
incurred, were the result of a risk or hazard against which the
insured was covered by the policy. This question is to be deter-
mined by consideration of the policy as a whole, construing any
17 New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Young, 290 Fed. 155 (9th Cir. 1923).
18 Cova v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 100 S.W. 2d 23 (Mo. App. 1937).
19 Shirley v. Tri-State -..........Okla -------------- 274 P. 2d 386 (1954).
20 Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Sikes, 197 Okla. 137, 168 P. 2d 1016 (1945).
21 Bruener v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 37 Wash. 2d 181, 222 P. 2d 833 (1950).
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ambiguities against the company, to ascertain the intention of the
parties as it is disclosed by the language used in the policy
itself."
4. THE AMBIGUITY RULE AND TEMPORARY INSURANCE
The growing practice in applications for life, health and acci-
dent insurance is to encourage the prepayment of premiums by
the use of receipts attached to the application. These so-called
"binding receipts" are to be detached only if the application is
accompanied by payment of the first premium due on the policy.
The incentive for the earlier payment is furnished by a provision
in the receipt to the effect that the policy is to revert back and
take effect as of the date thereon. Some courts think that this
provision for an earlier effective date leads laymen to believe
that they will be covered in the interim between application for
and final issuance of the policy provided the early payment is
made.2" Ordinarily the receipt does not alter the conditions
precedent in the application which are to be discharged before
the insurer incurs any liability thereunder;24 where there is some
change in the applicant's physical condition before a policy has
been issued, a contract for temporary insurance must be found
if the insurer is to be held liable.
The courts that think there is some doubt as to the parties'
intention in making an early payment apply the ambiguity rule
and hold that both parties intended to make a contract for tem-
porary insurance.25 Reference is made to the fact that to hold
otherwise is to allow the insurer to collect a premium for a period
in which it assumes no risk. 26 The great weight of authority, how-
ever, is to the effect that there is no element of doubt to which
the ambiguity rule can be applied. 27 These courts point out that
an application for insurance is merely an offer which necessarily
needs an acceptance in the form of approval of the application
in order to ripen into a binding contract. 2
22184 Tenn. 11, 195 S.W. 2d 15, 17 (1946).
23 See note, 2 A.L.R. 2d at 955 for collection of cases.
24 Olson v. American Cent. L. Ins. Co., 172 Minn. 511, 216 N.W. 225 (1927).
25 Western & S. L. Ins. Co. v. Vale, 213 Ind. 601, 12 N.E. 2d 350 (1938).
26 Starr v. Mutual L. Ins. Co., 41 Wash. 228, 83 Pac. 116 (1905).
27 Eyring v. Kansas City L. Ins. Co., 234 Mo. App. 328, 129 S.W. 2d 1068 (1939).
28 Hughes v. John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co., 163 Misc. 31, 297 N. Y. S. 116 (1937).
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A recent Texas case adopted the majority rule where the appli-
cant died before the insurer had taken any action on his applica-
tion. 9 The applicant's check for the first premium had been de-
posited, but the receipt made acceptance of the payment condi-
tional upon final approval of the application. An earlier case
which had recognized temporary insurance was distinguished as
the application in that case required no further condition other
than the payment of the premium."0 Other Texas cases had dis-
allowed recovery where the applicant suffered a change in physical
condition before delivery, 1 and before completion of a medical
examination."
The Oklahoma decisions are not entirely clear on this point. In
a recent case the applicant died before the policy was delivered
and accepted by him as required in the application.33 He had
made the first payment, and a policy had been issued and deliv-
ered to the insurer's agent for final delivery to the applicant. Five
judges thought these facts constituted a delivery at law. 4 It was
then held that delivery and acceptance are the same requirement. 5
The dissent pointed out that the case relied on by the majority as
authority for this proposition involved "delivered to and received"
rather than "delivered to and accepted." Under the dissent's view,
the majority erred in not recognizing that "accepted" is a much
stronger term than "received." The majority view, where delivery
and acceptance are conditions precedent, is there can be no lia-
bility until they are both discharged, unless there can be found
a contract of temporary insurance."
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the situations discussed establish the propo-
sition that the ambiguity "rule" is actually more a policy of the
courts than a rule of law. The irreconcilable conflict in the de-
29 Evans v. Southwestern L. Co., 262 S.W. 2d 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref.
30 Colorado L. Ins. v. Teague, 117 S.W. 2d 849 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error ref.,
n.r.e.
81 Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Rudolph, 45 Tex. 454 (1876).
32 Beaty v. Southland L. Ins. Co., 28 S.W. 2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) error dism.
33 Mid-Continent L. Ins. Co. v. Dees -.....- - -- Okla - ----... 269 P. 2d 322 (1954).
34 Unterharnscheit v. State L. Ins. Co., 160 Iowa 223, 138 N.W. 459 (1912).
86 Republic Nat'l L. Ins. Co. v. Merkley, 56 Ariz. 125, 124 P. 2d 313 (1942).
3 1 Kronjaeger v. Travelers Ins. Co., 124 W. Va. 730, 22 S.E. 2d 689 (1942).
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cisions on these matters is the outgrowth of a clash in fundamental
principles. A motivating factor in all cases involving the con-
struction of insurance policies is the court's viewpoint concerning
the freedom of contract. This contemplates a decision as to what
extent the public interest in the freedom of contract outweighs the
public interest in protecting a party with little bargaining power
from oppressive conditions forced upon him by a party with
superior bargaining power. The attorney should consider the in-
equitable position of the parties on a matter of such public neces-
sity as insurance both in advising the client as to his rights under
a policy and presenting his case to the court.
Dawson French.
